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Abstract While accepting the need for research which focuses on the social meaning of the home, 
this article takes issue with some of Saunders' and Williams' formulations for a research programme 
-- in particular, the emphasis given to physical and design features of the home at the expense of an 
understanding of more fundamental gender and generational relations within the home. It attempts 
to uncover the assumptions lying behind those formulations, to clarify some of the conceptual 
confusions, and to point out some of the serious theoretical difficulties which such formulations 
have to resolve. It argues that theoretical advance in this area does not have to depend upon the 
adoption of a Weberian perspective, but must be situated within a broader theory of the production 
and maintenance of ideology, and this theory must be explicitly linked with theories of power and 
kinship. In particular, it is emphasised that power relations within the home, associated mainly with 
gender and age differences, need to be investigated in greater depth if the social significance of the 
home is to be properly understood.  
Introduction  
In a recent article in Housing Studies (April, 1988) Saunders and Williams attempted to outline a new 
research agenda on the home'. Through focusing on the home' they aimed to throw new light on the 
nature of household structures and relationships, gender relations, property rights, privacy, 
privatism, and privatisation. They also aimed to contribute to the development of a 'sociology of 
consumption', linking housing with community, neighbourhood and social status. They argued for 
the importance of the home as a locale', and suggested that conceiving of the home in this way can 
help to explain the structuring of activities and relationships within the home. In order to 
demonstrate the cultural significance of the home in our society, they described various physical 
processes and symbolic meanings associated with features of dwelling design, estate layout, 
relationships among neighbours, and divisions of labour within households; and they attempted to 
relate the material trappings of domestic status and territory to wider realities of class, ethnic and 
tenurial divisions. They noted further that the meaning of the home is different in Britain from that 
in other countries, and argued that this was because in Britain the home is the institutional basis and 
expression of the "private sphere'" (p88). They attempted to support this argument through 
analyses of concepts of privacy, privatism and privatisation, drawing upon evidence concerning the 
increasing importance of home-based production and consumption activities, and reflecting upon 
the implications of these changes for social stratification - in particular, the growing divide between 
those who do and those who do not own their own home. 
 Weberian perspectives  
The theoretical position adopted in the article by Saunders and Williams in Housing Studies is 
essentially Weberian, but this is nowhere explicitly stated. The definition of social class, the 
assumption that society consists of basic units', the belief in the autonomy of 'culture', and the 
invocation of Versteheri, are all expressions of a Weberian perspective. For an analysis which the 
authors describe as tentative', I would not have expected such a marked theoretical bias, or at least I 
would have expected some recognition that this was indeed to be the reference point for their 
analysis. As it is, their Weberian approach could be criticised on a number of grounds, for example: 
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Whatever society may be (and there is no attempt to conceptualise it in this article), it does not 
consist of basic units' - or at least if it does, then this point needs to be proved and not assumed a 
priori. Pahl (1984) does not prove that the household is the basic economic unit' through which to 
analyse both production and consumption because he does not properly analyse the economic 
processes which impinge upon the household from outside. Many people would argue that if 
anything can be said to be a basic economic unit' then it would be the firm rather than the 
household. The same people would probably question whether there really has been too much 
emphasis on production' issues in the past at the expense of 'consumption', and others would argue 
that many of the current defects in urban sociology stem rather from a failure to grasp that 
production' and 'consumption', are inextricably intertwined (do we really have to keep going back to 
Marx's 1857 Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy to remind ourselves of this?). The 
point here, however, is simply that the case for thinking of 'society1 in terms of basic units' has not 
been made, whether these units be conceived in terms of individuals, households, firms, families, or 
whatever. In spite of what the authors say (p82), their assumption is atomist, because they conceive 
of households as the atoms of society, and they argue that although these atoms have their own 
internal structure they are 'indivisible' (p83). The effect of their argument is therefore to replace an 
old atomism of individuals with a new atomism of households - the old ideology of individualism 
becomes transformed into a new ideology of householdism. The authors argue that the 
ineffectiveness of corporatist initiatives and state planning in Britain are to be explained not 
(apparently) by reference to economic and political factors, but in terms of Britain's peculiar 'cultural 
heritage' (p88). They then go on to state that it is this 'cultural heritage' which makes the idea of the 
home so important in Britain, and by so doing they have absolved themselves from the need to 
explain this idea in anything other than 'cultural' (ie ideological) terms. In other words, rather like 
Weber they have set up their position in such a way that they can always justify remaining at the 
level of ideology, without having to concern themselves with deeper levels of explanation. The 
authors' concept of explanation appears itself to be unsatisfactory. Concepts of locale and socio-
spatial systems are used in contexts which suggest that the authors believe that such concepts 
actually explain something, when it could be argued that all they really do is to reproduce common 
sense knowledge in abstract theoretical language, Alice Coleman is criticised for producing 'causal 
adequacy without Verstehen' (p83) and it is implied that Verstehen' would count as adequate 
explanation in the sense of 'an understanding of how social action is routinely constituted within a 
context of spatiality1 (p83). It could be argued in contrast that Alice Coleman provides neither causal 
adequacy nor Versteherf (eg see Hillier, 1986, 1988), and that Vesteheri itself, or rather the social 
meanings which are its object, can never be taken at face value but must always be explained in 
terms of the wider social structure.  
Home sweet home  
Although Saunders' and Williams' Weberianism is questionable, their attempt to broaden the scope 
of urban sociology from its present almost exclusive concentration on the public realm and to 
develop a better understanding of private matters is to be welcomed. It represents a laudable move 
away from urban sociology's traditional sexism (in which for example, domestic problems' were not 
recognised as urban problems at all), and (possibly) an incorporation at long last of the recognition 
that the personal is also political. It is unfortunate, therefore, that there are serious difficulties with 
some of their formulations on the home', tentative though these may be. For example:  
What is home?  
The home is described as the active and reproduced fusion' of household and house (p88). The 
concepts of household (as social unit) and house (as physical unit) are therefore crucial to the 
description (or is it definition?) of the home. From the standpoint of this description or definition, 
the meaning of home is allowed to vary only as between household members, different types of 
household, and different geographical areas (p85). The problems with this formulation are: Firstly, it 
presupposes that which needs to be proved, ie that the home is actually constituted by means of 
such a fusion'. As an empirical concept, however, it is far from obvious that the home is always or 
necessarily constituted in this way - eg what about homes for the elderly and disabled, the Home 
Counties, the Home Guard, the Home Office, etc? 'Home' used in these senses does not seem to 
involve reference to either "household' or Tiouse'. There is also Austerberry and Watson's 114 
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homelessness, which established an enormous variety of meanings of home', only some of which 
included ideas of household' and house'. Empirically, therefore, it seems only partially correct at 
best to describe the home1 as a fusion of household' and house'. Secondly, if it is intended as a 
theoretical concept, then it must be pointed out that it explains nothing and provides no guidance 
for empirical research. Households and houses are understood only in an empirical sense, so the 
idea of fusing the two adds nothing to our understanding unless, of course, we have some theory of 
how the fusion takes place, and Saunders and Williams have no such theory. The home is said, for 
example, to reflect' the wider culture, while also playing a part in 'constituting1 that culture (p88). 
Fine, but this tells us nothing about the basis of such reciprocal determinations, ie what exactly are 
the relationships involved? Thirdly, in spite of their recognition of the varying meanings of home', 
the authors do not seem fully to appreciate the ideological character of the concept. After all, if the 
home is where the heart is, how is it possible for it to be a socio-spatial system, let alone a fusion of 
household and house? In ideology, as Althusser said, we see things sub specie eternitatis, not in the 
mundate world of space and time. The visible forms of households and housing, and all the material 
baggage that goes with them, are relevant not in themselves, but solely because of the 'eternal 
truths' which they may symbolise. In the end, therefore, it is not really very important whether the 
home is a socio-spatial system or not, or what kind of system, if any, it is. What is important is to 
analyse what the home means to different people and to attempt to explain the range of different 
meanings that we find.  
The importance of the home  
The home is said to be the crucial medium through which the society is structured (p84), but this 
statement is not justified, and is not even explained except in a reference to the home being the 
base point around which local and national politics is organised' (p84). In fact, it seems more 
reasonable to hypothesise that the home is only one of a number of locales, the others being school, 
workplace, shop, place of leisure or recreation and office. It may well be that in some sense which 
remains to be clarified the home is more important than these other locales, but this needs to be 
proved, not assumed. In the mean time, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that In fact capital-
labour relations are crucial for structuring 'society1 , and domestic relations are secondary - but of 
course it may just depend upon what is meant by 'society1 . Saunders and Williams are surely right 
in saying that the home is more than being the place of women's unpaid work, of the reproduction 
of labour power, and of the socialisation of the young (p84) because it also structures gender and 
age relations to a significant extent, and is closely linked with perceptions of neighbourhood and 
territory (and also nationhood, although the authors do not state this explicitly). What they fail to 
notice, however, is that the relations which play the key role in ensuring the home's social 
importance are not those of household and house but those of kinship and family. It is the family, 
not the household, which ensures reproduction of labour power and the socialisation of the young 
and which helps to explain the existence of women's unpaid work; and it is kinship relations, not 
household relations, which help to explain the creation of communities and nations. Saunders and 
Williams are seriously mistaken to say that the kinship system has arguably declined in significance 
as a structuring principle of social life' (p82), because the evidence shows rather that the family has 
if anything become more important in relation to housing, education, consumption patterns, and so-
called 'community care'; and although there has undoubtedly been an increase in the numbers of 
hon-family1 households, the vast majority of the population (over 80 per cent) continue to live as 
members of traditional' families (eg see Rimmer and Popay, 1982, p53; or General Household 
Surveys, 1984, 1985, 1986) and opinion polls show that even higher proportions (up to 90 per cent - 
eg MORI, 1982) prefer it that way. Focusing on the family rather than the household also helps to 
explain why the home should come to be so important, because the family, like the home, has 
strongly emotive connotations, which are lacking in the case of household'. The home is therefore 
socially important not only because it happens to be the locale through which key kinship ties are 
continually reinforced (eg see Franklin, 1986), but also because it is seen to be crucial by the people 
involved (eg 'charity begins at home' or my family always comes first with me'; or, to quote a famous 
politician There is no such thing as society: there are only people and their families' - and of course 
these families' are all assumed to live in homes', ie homeless families are ignored).  
Relationships within the home  
Partly because of their concentration on household' and house' instead of family1 and partly be- 115 
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their failure to grasp the nature and causation of tome' as an ideological construct, Saunders' and 
Williams' account of relationships within the home tends to be rather superficial. For example, it 
could be argued that they attach too much weight to the spatial and physical differentiation of 
gender-related activities (ie predominantly men working outside the home and women inside the 
home; high-energy but low-information women's work, and low-energy but high-information men's 
work, within the home, etc). Apart from the fact that these propositions could be questioned, 
anyway (eg what about 'Do It Yourself within the home, which is carried out predominantly by 
men?), this approach surely misses the main point, which is that the gender division of labour within 
the home is based on functional stereotypes rather than physical regularities (although the latter are 
to some extent determined by the former). Whether a particular task is performed by men rather 
than by women will depend not so much upon whether it is external rather than internal to the 
home, high-information rather than low-information, etc, but upon how that task features within 
the overall construction of the gender division of labour - eg if it confers higher status it is more 
likely to be male, or if it is seen to be (even if it is not really) 'difficult' or technical'. Physical 
differentiation may seem to be important here - eg work on structure, exterior and fixtures of the 
home is overwhelmingly carried out by men - but in reality this differentiation is significant only to 
the extent that it reflects the traditional division of labour in our society between men as home-
builders and possessors, and women as home-managers and unpaid domestic servants. Some of the 
ritual details of domestic activity to which Saunders and Williams refer (eg the woman cooking the 
dinner for guests, while the man serves the drinks) cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of 
some kind of 'cybernetic hierarchy1 - this would indeed be a case of 'correlation without 
understanding1 . Rather, an adequate explanation must be based not on stereotypical 
generalisations, but on a detailed analysis of the relevant social relationships within the home. As 
Christine Delphy (1984) has said, the sexual division of labour is not a division of tasks but of 
jobs'(p206). In short, a real understanding of relationships within the home must at best 
demonstrate how the physical characteristics of the housing and the detail of task performance 
within the housing are relevant, ie how they manage to symbolise the labour relations involved. 
These relationships then need to be explained, in terms of new theories of gender, family and social 
structure. My own very provisional view is that there are at least two important modes of 
symbolisation, one in relation to the achievement of social status (as mentioned above), and a 
second in relation to ideas of art, beauty, skill and individuality of expression (eg the copious 
literature on principles of architectural design). These two modes of symbolisation do of course 
overlap but they are nevertheless quite distinct - eg cooking at home is generally a low-status 
activity, and is much more likely to be carried out by women because of the gender division of 
labour. In terms of social status, therefore, 'cooking1 symbolises low1 in the home, and this remains 
the case irrespective of what is actually cooked. In terms of aesthetics, however, cooking is an art 
form, and as paid rather than unpaid work, it is capable of conferring relatively high status, though 
on the whole it does not. What needs to be explained is why the undoubted art and skill of cooking 
is systematically ignored or downgraded, not only within the home but in society generally. 
Saunders' and Williams' account of relationships within the home is simplistic not only with regard to 
gender relations but with respect to age relations as well. For example they assume that individuals 
can have 'autonomy1 only within their own home, so children have to leave their parents' home 
before they can enjoy 'autonomy1 . This analysis seems to rule out the possibility that parents might 
share their autonomy in the home with their children, and yet we know that parents commonly do 
allow their children to have their own personal space within the home from quite an early age, and it 
is possible for this space to grow as the child gets older. If the child remains at home after it has 
grown up, it can and sometimes does happen that the balance of power within the home changes so 
that the home eventually becomes that of the child rather than the parents. In short, Saunders and 
Williams, by concentrating on the unit of the household rather than the family, have failed to 
appreciate the importance of the dynamics of relationships between generations. What is most 
significantly missing from Saunders' and Williams' account of relationships within the home, 
however, is any understanding of possible tensions between individuals' perceptions of what 
relationships within the home should be like and what they are really like. Since they conceive of the 
home as a basic unit, the authors have no means of dealing theoretically with contradictions within 
that unit. This perhaps explains their peremptory dismissal of crucial issues such as 116 Downloaded 
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abuse as being due to the foternalisatiori of the general 'crisis' of British society (p90). In their 
concern with the dominant ideology of the home as a sanctuary and safe haven, they fail adequately 
to appreciate that the reality of the home may be something quite different For example, there has 
long been a contradiction between the belief in sex equality, subscribed to by a large majority of 
married couples, and the reality of sex inequality, produced mainly by a patriarchal economic and 
political system. Ideologies of the home, involving the pursuit of happiness through domestic 
consumption, help to support the patriarchal and capitalist status quo by means of the new opiates 
of consumer goods and leisure activities. Similarly, the ideology of the traditional' heterosexual two-
parent family, in combination with women's forced economic dependence upon their husbands, 
ensures that on the whole women remain subject to men at home as well as at work. No discussion 
of relationships within the home can be complete without an analysis of how such relations of 
domination and subordination come about, plus an account of the dynamics of the attempts by men 
and women at home to resolve the tensions between their ideals and the reality of life in Thatcher's 
Britain. The explanation of the evils of violence against wives and abuse of children within the home 
should therefore be sought initially in terms of the realities of male power within the home (as has 
already been done for women by Pahl (1985)), and then, when that has been understood, it will be 
appropriate to try and identify the basis of that male power in society outside the home.  
The wider significance of home  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Saunders and Williams do not correctly grasp the significance 
of the dichotomy between "public'and private'. Their conception of privacy, for example, fails to take 
account of the fact that the domain of the 'private' is not constituted only by the home, but also by a 
whole range of contractual relationships, among which economic relationships are probably the 
most important. There is a real sense in which business affairs are "private' (eg industrial espionage 
as a crime), in that outsiders can be effectively excluded. Even within public bodies, including the 
state itself, invocations of confidentiality and the need for secrecy can maintain vital areas of 
decision-making free from the public gaze. In each case, whether it be done at home, at work, or in 
politics, the alleged need for privacy comes into conflict with the alleged need of the public to know 
what goes on behind closed doors'. Privacy is therefore not just a matter of an individual's or 
household's freedom from public surveillance or interference, but of the power to exclude members 
of the public from any body whatever. Saunders and Williams are also wrong with regard to the 
constitution of the 'public', insofar as they appear to assume that public surveillance means 
surveillance by the state. This is essentially the same mistake as that made by Alice Coleman, 
because the latter equates public control of space with state control of that space. She then 
attributes the evils of public sector housing to the existence of state control and argues that the 
remedies for such evils are to be found by maximising the privatisation of such space at the level of 
the household (giving each household its own private entrance, sharing access to one's home with as 
few other people as possible, giving ground-floor flats their own fenced-off gardens, etc). Such views 
fail to appreciate that many of the problems which beset council housing management can only be 
alleviated through increasing public surveillance (though not necessarily surveillance by the state) - 
eg in order to reduce crime, litter, graffiti, urine, faeces, etc. Because they misconceive the nature of 
privacy, Saunders and Williams also misunderstand the nature of privatism and privatisation. Just as 
privacy is not necessarily home-based (eg it can be individual-based, firm-based or group-based), so 
also with privatism. Privatism sees the private sphere as intrinsically more worthwhile than the 
public sphere, even to the extent of denying the existence of the public sphere (or 'society1 ) 
altogether. (Familial ideologies, for example, are privatist because they value the 'private' concerns 
of the family above all 'public' concerns, including those of the state.) This does not necessarily 
mean, however, a Withdrawal from collective life' unless the privatism is exclusively home-based. 
What it does involve is rather the privatisation of that collective life as far as possible, ie the political 
and ideological transformation of collective activity by means of extending the privacy of property as 
well as home. Saunders' and Williams' characterisation of privatisation is indeed simplistic - ie 
'privatisation refers simply to change of ownership relations' (p90), from a collectivity (normally the 
state) to the individual' (p90). Privatisation needs instead to be understood as a complex set of 
political strategies, held together loosely by anti-collectivist ideology, and deriving largely from the 
interests of private capital in restructuring the 117 Downloaded by [University of Lincoln] at 03:54 18 
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sector tenants, for example, is just one of these political strategies. It is true, as Saunders and 
Williams say, that on the whole owner occupation does confer greater private control over one's 
home, but even with regard to the home (and less so in the case of work organisations) there is no 
simple relationship between privatisation and increased power for individual households - there are 
many so-called rnarginal' home owners, for example, who are trapped' in poorquality housing (eg 
see Kam, Kemeny, and Williams, 1986), and the alterations which council tenant purchasers so 
frequently make to their homes may only be symbolic gestures in some cases rather than evidence 
of any real increase in control. With the best will in the world, it is difficult to see how a research 
agenda focused on the home can lead to a better understanding of privatisation strategies.  
Conclusion  
In this comment, I have attempted to indicate some of the defects in Saunders' and Williams' project 
for a new sociology of the home. I have argued that their formulations contain a hidden 
Weberianism and essentialism, that they fail to appreciate the concept of home as an ideological 
construct, that their neglect of kinship structures and ideologies leads to simplistic and distorted 
representations of relationships within households, and that their formulation of the distinction 
between private' and public' is incomplete and one-sided. Saunders and Williams are right to draw 
attention to the (increasing) importance of the private realm of the home, but their research agenda 
does not appear to allow for an investigation of the ways in which this importance is socially 
constructed. They are right to point out that we need to gather a lot more empirical evidence about 
the role of home in people's lives, but their formulations do not enable us to distinguish between 
evidence which is important and advances our understanding, and that which is trivial or merely 
reinforces our preconceived ideas. They pay homage to Giddens' structuration theory, but their own 
agenda is eclectic and not structurationist. Above all, in conceiving of the home as real object (a 
socio-spatial system) whose nature and functioning is to be explained by means of a new sociological 
theory of the home, they fail to appreciate that the home must also be understood as an ideal place, 
whose character is to be explained by reference to its social context - ie the institutions and 
ideologies which are dominant in British society today. 
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